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1 Introduction
With the link between exports and economic growth well established, numerous govern-
ment policies have sought to encourage exports as a method of increasing productivity
and growth. One such policy that has been widely utilized is the special economic zone
(SEZ).1 According to the World Bank (2008), as of 2008 there were over 3500 SEZs which
amounted to 68 million jobs and over $500 billion in trade-related value added. As of
2015, the number of SEZs stood at more than 4000 (The Economist, 2015; Nazarczuk,
2017). As described in Farole (2011), an SEZ is a defined geographic area in which
special incentives and/or policies apply that are not available elsewhere in the country.
Zeng (2015) notes that common SEZ features include streamlined processing of goods
ready for export, lower export fees, and reductions in taxes and import tariffs on inter-
mediates, all of which aim to make SEZ firms more competitive on world markets. As
such, they are intended to be areas that encourage development via increased export-
ing, innovation, and investment. That said, setting up a production in an SEZ involves
high fixed costs followed by uncertainty over the stability of the benefits SEZ residents
will receive.2 Furthermore, the usefulness of SEZ production is obviously contingent on
the economic conditions a firm operates in and therefore changes in investment climate,
institutional quality, or trade policy in the SEZ-granting country or overseas can impact
their usefulness to firms (Aggarwal, 2012). As such, even if the polices announced in
an SEZ are attractive on the surface, this may not be enough to induce changes to firm
behavior.
Although there is a large body of case studies that provide often contradictory find-
ings about the impact of SEZs on firm choices, there is little rigorous evidence on their
economic impacts, particularly with respect to their main goal of promoting exporting.3
With this in mind, this paper uses data on 11,161 firms across 21 Asian and African
countries to test whether SEZs affect exports at either the extensive margin (i.e. whether
to export at all) and/or the intensive margin (that is, how much to export conditional
on exporting at all).4 Specifically, we use an exporter dummy variable for our extensive
margin analysis and both the logged share of exports in total sales the logged value of
total exports as measure of the intensive margin.5 We find that the estimated impact is
conditional on the local economic environment. In open economies, SEZs increase the
1In the literature, several types of SEZs are discussed, including freeports, free trade zones, export
promotion zones and industrial parks. Nevertheless, there is no clear-cut distinction between these with
the definitions depending on the study at hand (see Akinci and Farole (2011) for discussion). Since our
data do not distinguish among types of SEZs, we combine all of these under this single heading.
2See Yang, et al. (2011) for a discussion of the costs of operating in an SEZ. Nazarczuk (2015) and
Madani (1999) describe the uncertainty over the stability and longevity of SEZ provisions.
3See Zeng (2015), Farole and Akinci (2011), and Farole (2011) for examples and surveys of the literature.
4In particular, Zeng (2015) notes the lack of analysis of African SEZs. Aggarwal (2005) provides a
review the main EPZs (Export Processing Zones) of India, finding that exports from EPZs have grown
dramatically and now account for 50% of Indian manufacturing exports and 80% of their exports of
electrical products. Note that Indian firms make up roughly half of our data.
5Intensive margin changes would result from SEZ effects on marginal costs (such as export duties
or VAT rates) whereas changes at the extensive margin would also include changes in the fixed cost of
exporting (such as red tape costs).
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probability of exporting by 25% but have no marked effect on the intensive margin of
trade. In closed economies, SEZs appear to lower the probability of exporting, poten-
tially due to increased scrutiny by trade officials. That said, they do appear to increase
the value of trade by as much as 42%. Thus, in order to anticipate the potential effects of
an SEZ, it is necessary to consider them in context of the local economic environment.
Alongside the rise of SEZs, an economic literature has grown to examine the link be-
tween SEZs, trade, and economic growth. On the theory side of this discussion, the focus
has been on describing when and how to best use SEZs to improve exports and growth.6
On the empirical side, the large majority of the literature is descriptive, discussing the
experience of areas with SEZs via aggregated data. Examples here include Bra¨utigam
and Tang (2014), Aggarwal (2005), Ge (1999), Amirahmadi and Wu (1995), and the con-
tributions collected by Farole and Akinci (2011) and Farole (2011). On the whole, the
indications from this literature are best described as mixed, with some suggesting that
SEZs have sizable impacts on trade, investment, and welfare while others find the oppo-
site. In any case, this literature does not employ regression analysis, instead relying on
summary statistics for evaluating the impact of SEZs on exports.
There are, however, exceptions to this rule.7 Leong (2013), in a regression estimating
the impact of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) on growth in Chinese and Indian
regions, uses SEZs as an instrument for these endogenous variables.8 However, he does
not report the first stage results, and thus the impact of SEZs on exports, from his esti-
mation. Also using Chinese regional data, Wang (2013) estimates the impact of factors
such as FDI and exports on regional capital investment and productivity growth, finding
that after the introduction of an SEZ, both variables have larger effects than before the
SEZ was instituted. Likewise, Jensen and Winiarczyk (2014) consider the impact of SEZs
on the development of Polish regions. They find that although SEZs there have attracted
FDI, they have contributed little to employment or wage improvements. Closer to our
level of analysis, Ebenstein (2012) utilizes firm-level information for China to examine
the impact of SEZs on firm employment, productivity, and wages, finding positive ef-
fects on the first two. However, despite the stated SEZ goal of export promotion, none
of these studies estimate the effect of SEZs on exports themselves.9 10
To our knowledge, only a handful of studies specifically examine SEZs and exports
using regression analysis. Johansson and Nilsson (1997) estimate the impact of SEZs
on aggregate exports for eleven developing countries over 13 years. While they tend to
6Examples include Klein (2010), Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2010), Schweinberger (2003), Yabuuchi
(2000), Devereux and Chen (1995), Din (1994), Miyagawa (1992, 1986), and Hamilton and Svennson (1982).
7Beyond the studies discussed here specifically related to SEZs, Busso, Gregory, and Klien (2013) esti-
mate the effect of empowerment zones in the US (a place specific policy comparable to a SEZ without the
SEZ’s international focus) on local employment and wage growth.
8When not using an instrumental variables estimator but including SEZs as a control variable, Leong
(2013) found that SEZs had no clear-cut effect on growth, with the coefficient ranging from significantly
positive to insignificant or even significantly negative depending on the controls and sample used.
9Although not a regression based analysis, Defever and Rian˜o (2015) calibrate Chinese data to a model
with SEZs, inferring that SEZs have a sizable impact on exports.
10Yang, et al. (2011) focus on Cross-Border SEZs (CB-SEZs) around Chinese border which promotes
cross-border trade with neighbors. However, they do not analyze exporting but rather various measures
of firm performance.
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find a positive effect, the country-specific results indicate a great deal of heterogeneity,
leading them to conclude that the export promotion effects are potentially positive only
for generally export-oriented economies something which, due to the exclusion of fixed
effects, they cannot control for. In contrast, by using firm-level data we can do precisely
that. In particular, by doing so, we are able to illustrate that the conditionality hinted at
by Johansson and Nilsson (1997) is a driving factor in the effect of SEZs. Most similar to
our analysis are the various single country, firm-level studies that examine SEZ influence
on exporting at the extensive and intensive margins. Examples here include Nazarczuk
and Uminski (2018) (Poland) and Defever, et al. (2017) (Dominican Republic). One issue
issue for these studies is that they do not address the potential endogeneity of SEZs (i.e.
that they may be established in areas where FDI or productive firms are already present).
As found in the single country studies of Steenbergen and Javorcik (2017) (Rwanda) and
Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018) (Poland) matching across firms is the standard method
of doing so, a practice we also use.11 Our results complement all of these by using
cross-country data as opposed to that for a single country. In particular, it is worth
noting that some find positive effects on exporting (e.g. Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018))
whereas others find no effect (including Steenbergen and Javorcik (2017)). One possible
reason for this is that, as suggested by Johansson and Nilsson (1997), underlying country
heterogeneity may have an important effect. By using cross-country data, we are able to
examine how the SEZ effect depends on trade policy, offering a potential rationale for
the different effects in the literature.
Using our firm-level data covering 21 African and Asian countries, we begin by com-
paring firms in SEZs to non-SEZ firms. We find that SEZ firms are generally more
export oriented at the extensive and intensive margins, being both more likely to export
and exporting greater values, although the share of revenue generated from exports is
somewhat smaller. This mirrors the data of Johansson and Nilsson (1997). However, we
also find that, among other differences, SEZ firms are more productive, larger, and more
likely to be foreign-owned, all things found in the literature to be positively associated
with exporting. Nazarczuk (2017) finds the same pattern in Polish data by looking at
Kernel densities of firm characteristics of SEZ and non-SEZ firms. Turning to regression
analysis where we can control for fixed country, sector, and year effects, we find that it
indeed these other firm-specific factors that explain the greater export activity of SEZ
firms. This result, however, is an average effect. We proceed by allowing the impact
of the SEZ to vary with local country-level characteristics which are intended to reflect
the types of barriers SEZs supposedly mitigate, namely export costs, taxes, regulatory
burdens, weak institutions, and barriers to imports. Here, we find two results. First,
when exporting and/or importing is relatively easy, firms in SEZs do indeed seem more
likely to export. In contrast, when a country is closed, we find a negative impact of SEZs
on the extensive margin. This may be due to closed countries’ trade authorities heavily
11Note that Steenbergen and Javorcik (2017) performs the propensity score matching with difference-
in-difference option and find that if a firm chooses to move to a SEZ that fact doubles its output and its
imports but no real impact of exporting. Nazarczuk (2017) uses a matching estimator on Polish firms but
exporting status is a control, not a dependent variable in the analysis of firm productivity. It is also worth
noting the contribution of Wang (2013) who uses a matching estimator across Chinese regions rather than
firms. Alder, et al. (2013) do not use matching, but follow Wang (2013) by using Chinese cities.
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monitoring activities with SEZs, reflective of the possibilities raised by Johansson and
Nilsson (1997). Both of these effects are large; the first suggests a 25% increase in the
probability of exporting whereas the second implies a nearly 100% decrease. Second,
for firms that do export, SEZs lead to higher export values when importing is difficult,
with export sales rising approximately 42%. This is consistent with the notion that SEZs
often permit importing at lower cost. Thus, although throughout our analysis we find
no significant effect at the mean, we do find important effects depending on the coun-
try’s openness to trade. Although our data do not allow us to distinguish whether these
differences are due to cross-country differences in the SEZs themselves or arise from
their interactions with other policies that vary across countries, it does point to a strong
conditionality of their effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an
overview of our data, including a discussion of its overarching features. Section 4 de-
scribes our econometric approach and provides our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Summary Statistics
2.1 Data Sources and Construction
Our firm-level data come from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys.12 Note that our data
come from the more recent, unstandardized surveys as only these included a question
on whether or not a firm was in an SEZ.13 This also limits the country coverage relative
to the standardized surveys, leaving us with 21 African and South Asian countries, with
their surveys being carried out between 2007 and 2014. The data are cross-sectional, with
surveys taking place once in each country.14 Although the data include observations on
services and retail/wholesale firms, as these firms do not face the same types of export
barriers manufacturers do, we restrict the data to manufacturing.15 After cleaning and
harmonizing across the countries, the surveys have a similar layout and were conducted
using a common methodology of random stratified sampling.16 In all surveys, the World
Bank defines the survey universe as “commercial, service or industrial business estab-
lishments with at least five fulltime-employees”. The list of countries in our sample, the
year of their survey, the number of observations, and the number of observations within
an SEZ is provided in Table 1. In total, the sample contains 11,161 firms, 58% of which
are in SEZs.17
12These can be found at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/
13To our knowledge, ours is the first analysis of these more recent data.
14A handful of countries have been surveyed twice, however, as we cannot tell which firms were sur-
veyed more than once, we cannot use this aspect of the data and therefore only use the largest survey
round for each country. Similar approach has been used by Davies and Jeppesen (2015).
15Specifically, we use firms in industries 15 to 37 using the ISIC 3.1 Rev. Classification.
16 Specifically, it uses strata on firm size (with three categories: <20 employees, 20-99 employees, and
100+ employees).
17This sample is the one for which all of our country-level controls were available. In unreported results,
depending on the country level controls included, we were able to increase the number of firms to 12,279
over 31 countries. This, however, did not affect the nature of the estimates. These are available on request.
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Table 1: Countries in the Sample
Country Num. of Firms Num. of SEZ Firms Year
Angola 111 22 2010
Bangladesh 1138 172 2013
Botswana 88 49 2010
Burkina Faso 61 28 2009
Cameroon 65 18 2009
Chad 57 16 2009
Ethiopia 177 61 2011
India 6834 4523 2014
Lesotho 43 27 2009
Madagascar 116 30 2009
Mali 283 283 2007
Mauritius 126 29 2009
Mozambique 253 253 2007
Nepal 243 162 2013
Nigeria 45 15 2009
South Africa 506 506 2007
Sri Lanka 310 12 2011
Tanzania 229 2013
Togo 13 2009
Uganda 233 2013
Zambia 243 243 2007
Total 11161 6449
During the preparation of the unstandardized surveys we extracted several firm-
specific variables. In particular, we have three measures of firm exporting behaviour: a
exporter dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm exports, the log of the share
of sales generated by exporting (referred to as export intensity), and the log of the value
of exports. These variables are standard ones used by the literature to describe a firm’s
exporting behaviour at the extensive and intensive margins.18 In addition, we collected
several control variables identified by the literature as correlated with exporting. First,
we include labour productivity, measured as the log of sales relative to employment.19
Note that, although this measure does not control for other inputs, and is therefore
not productivity itself, it is commonly employed as such in the literature (see Pavnick,
2002). Second, as a measure of firm size, we use the logged value of employment. In
addition, we use the log of the firm’s age. Third, we include five dummy variables
respectively indicating whether or not a firm is foreign-owned, has an internationally
recognized quality certificate, is a multi-product firm, licenses foreign technology, or
imports intermediate inputs. Previous work using the standardized surveys finds that all
18Further, these have the best cross-country coverage in the surveys.
19All monetary values are reported in local currencies, which we deflate using the annual consumer
price index from the World Bank Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006-2014) and thereafter convert
to US dollars using the annual average exchange rate from the same source.
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of these are positively correlated both with the probability of exporting and the volume
of exports, thus our priors are that the same holds true in our data.20 Finally, and most
importantly for our purposes, we have information on whether or not the firm self-
identifies as being located in an SEZ.21 If, as is generally believed, firms in SEZs find
exporting both easier (due to lowered export barriers) and more profitable (due to lower
taxes and barriers to imported intermediates), we expect that firms in SEZs would be
more likely to export, have greater export sales, and have a higher export intensity.22
To explore this notion further, we introduce five country-level variables which rep-
resent measures of the types of barriers SEZs supposedly overcome. First, we create a
measure of policy-driven exporting costs, using the Trading Across Border data from the
World Bank Doing Business database (World Bank 2014).23 More specifically, we com-
bine three variables, the number of documents needed to export, the average number
of days before a container is cleared for export, and the average cost of containerized
export. We use these three measures precisely because the reflect the types of export
barriers SEZs are intended to reduce. Across all three, there is a relatively high cross-
country variation. The cost of exporting ranges from $560 in Sri Lanka to $6615 in Chad,
while the number of documents required range from 4 in Mauritius to 11 in Cameroon,
the Congo, and Nepal. Mauritius is also the country where it takes the least time to clear
cargo for exporting, with an average of 10 days. At the other end of the distribution is
Afghanistan, with an average of 86 days. That said, within a country, all three measures
are relatively highly correlated. Because of this, we follow Davies and Jeppesen (2015)
use principal component analysis to construct a source-specific export cost index. De-
tails from this construction are found in Table 2. If SEZs help firms by lowering export
barriers, we expect a positive coefficient from an interaction between the firm’s SEZ vari-
able and the country’s export cost variable since it is in those countries with the greatest
barriers that SEZs might provide the greatest benefits.
Second, we use a cross-country index that identifies the extent to which local busi-
ness owners find the level of taxes to be a barrier to work and investment. This was
rescaled so that higher numbers indicate more burdensome taxes.24 Third, we include
an index on the local perception of the quality of government institutions, with higher
numbers meaning lower institutional quality. Both of these were obtained from the
World Economic Forum (2014). From the Fraser Institute (2014), we obtained two addi-
20Examples include Davies and Jeppesen (2015) and Davies and Mazhikeyev (2015).
21The earlier surveys in our data only ask whether or not a firm is in an SEZ; some later ones further
break this down into whether the firm is located in an export processing zone or an industrial park.
We do not make use of this distinction here for two reasons. First, the World Bank do not provide any
information in the surveys or the implementation notes detailing the difference between the two, thus, it is
not clear whether or not this distinction is comparable across surveys. Furthermore, the existing literature
is itself at odds over the difference (if any) between the two (see Madani (1999) for discussion). Second,
using this information severely limits the sample size.
22For a discussion of the tax exemptions in African SEZs, see Bra¨utigam and Tang (2014).
23Note that as we do not have data on the export destination, we cannot control for destination-varying
trade costs, only for origin export costs.
24Specifically, in all the indices described here, we use the closest year available to the year of a given
country’s survey and when needed rescaled the variable so that higher numbers mean greater burdens.
See the relevant source for discussion on the construction of the particular index.
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tional indices: one measuring the burden of government regulation and one indicating
the extent to which non-tariff barriers (NTBs) reduce the ability of imported goods to
compete in local markets. Both of these were scaled so that higher numbers indicated
greater restrictions. As with the export cost variable, we expect the interactions between
firm i’s SEZ dummy and the local index to be positive, i.e. SEZ do more to promote
exports when local barriers are large. Summary statistics for all variables are in Table 3.
Table 2: Construction of Export Costs
Panel A: 1 2
Number of obs. 11161
Retained factors 1
No. parameters 3
Panel B: Eigenvalue Proportion
Factor1 1.9578 0.6526
Factor2 0.8639 0.288
Factor3 0.1781 0.0594
Panel C:
Variables Factor1 Loadings Uniqueness
Documents to export 0.5221 0.7274
Time to export 0.9416 0.1134
Cost to export 0.8937 0.2013
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Exporter 11161 0.205 0.404 0.000 1.000
Export Share 2291 -1.126 1.162 -5.298 0.000
Sales 2291 13.848 2.423 4.541 23.250
Productivity 11161 9.868 1.735 1.902 20.280
Employment 11161 3.699 1.335 0.000 11.074
Age 11161 2.680 0.803 0.000 5.242
Foreign Owned 11161 0.052 0.222 0.000 1.000
Quality Cert. 11161 0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000
Multi-product 11161 0.380 0.485 0.000 1.000
Import 11161 0.146 0.354 0.000 1.000
License 11161 0.130 0.336 0.000 1.000
Export Cost 11161 0.000 1.000 -1.883 5.958
Taxes 11161 -3.943 0.605 -4.800 0.000
Regulations 11161 -5.603 0.561 -6.598 -3.136
Institutions 11161 5.317 0.911 0.000 5.900
NTBs 11161 -5.991 0.637 -6.913 -3.529
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2.2 SEZ vs. Non-SEZ firms
Before proceeding to regression analysis, it is useful to make some simple comparisons
between SEZ and non-SEZ firms. Table 4 presents the means of our firm-level variables
for SEZ and non-SEZ firms. The third column presents the coefficient from the SEZ
dummy when regressing the variable in question on the SEZ dummy and a set of indus-
try, country, and year dummies. Beginning with the exporter dummy variable, 20.8%
of SEZ firms export, whereas 20.1% of non-SEZ firms do. After controlling for country,
industry, and year effects in what amounts to a linear probability model, we find that
SEZ firms are roughly 0.7% more likely to export with this difference highly significant.
Likewise, SEZ firms export a greater value, where the result in column 3 indicates that
SEZ firms export values are 37% higher than comparable firms.25 The mean of the ex-
port intensity, however, is 35.4% lower for SEZ firms. Thus, these results suggest that
SEZs may well increase exporting, if not the export intensity. However, it must be re-
membered that other factors also influence export activity and, as the rest of the table
indicates, these differences are also significant.
In particular, SEZ firms are markedly more productive and larger, two variables that
are typically positively correlated with exporting. 26 On a top of that, we find that SEZ
firms are 11.2% younger than their non-SEZ counterparts which would generally makes
them less export-oriented. Beyond these differences, we find that SEZ firms are slightly
more likely to be foreign-owned, import intermediates, and license a foreign technology.
The are also 21.4% more likely to have a quality certification. Finally, we find that they
are slightly less likely to be multi-product firms. Thus, just as we find SEZ firms are
more export oriented, we find that many of their characteristics also predispose them to
exporting. In order to simultaneously control for all of these differences, we now turn to
our regression analysis.
Table 4: SEZ Versus non-SEZ Firms
Variable SEZ non-SEZ Difference % Change
Exporter 0.208 0.201 0.007*** 0.7%
Export Share -1.307 -0.869 -0.437*** -35.4%
Export Sales 13.979 13.663 0.315*** 37.0%
Productivity 10.210 9.401 0.809*** 124.6%
Employment 3.779 3.589 0.190*** 20.9%
Age 2.633 2.744 -0.112*** -10.6%
Foreign Owned 0.058 0.044 0.014*** 1.4%
Quality Cert. 0.467 0.253 0.213*** 23.7%
Multi-product 0.352 0.418 -0.066** -6.4%
Import 0.146 0.147 0.000*** 0.0%
License 0.149 0.104 0.044*** 4.5%
Obs. 6449 4712
Notes: SEZ coefficient comes from a regression using SEZ,country, sector, and year dummies.
***, **, and * on difference denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Percent change is 100(eβ − 1) where β is the SEZ coefficient. The export intensity and export
value results only use exporting firms.25Recall that when interpreting a coefficient β on a dummy variable in a log-linear equation, the per-
centage impact of going from 0 to 1 is 100 ∗ (eβ − 1).
26Using data on Polish firms, Nazarczuk (2017) also finds that SEZ firms are more productive than
non-SEZ firms on average and that SEZ firms have greater value added per employee.
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3 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy makes use of both regression analysis and propensity score
matching. In Section 2, we found significant differences in the exporting behavior of
SEZ and non-SEZ firms. However, before attributing the differences to being in an SEZ,
it must be remembered that there were other significant differences as well which are
often found to be correlated with exporting choices. Therefore, we turn to regression
analysis that begins with a baseline specification (as specified below) to examine the rela-
tionship between SEZ status and exporting at the extensive and intensive margins while
controlling for other factors. Following this, because the presumption is that SEZs im-
pact exporting via lower trade barriers, we extend our regression specification by taking
into account a number of important obstacles firms face, namely export costs, non-tariff
barriers, taxes, institutional quality, and regulatory burden. We do so to investigate the
potential conditionality suggested by Johansson and Nilsson (1997). Finally, we address
the concern over the potential endogeneity in the SEZ variable, i.e. firms located in SEZs
are there precisely because they intend to export (or the opposite). Ebenstein (2012), for
instance, finds that in China, foreign-owned firms (many of which export) are indeed
more likely to open in SEZs than elsewhere (with no impact on the location of domestic
firms). Following, e.g. Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018), we therefore apply a propensity
score matching methodology.
3.1 The Regression Model
In our baseline specification, we estimate for firm i in country j in sector s surveyed in
year t:
EXPi = β0 + β1SEZi + β2Xi + θj + θs + θt + εi (1)
where EXPi is one of three measures of firm i’s export behavior (i.e. the exporter
dummy, logged export intensity, or logged export value), SEZi is a dummy equal to 1 if
the firm is in an SEZ, Xi is a vector of controls as discussed above, and the θs are a set of
country, sector, and year dummy variables. These latter then control for unobservables
common across firms in a given country (which are all observed for the same year),
common across firms in a given sector, and common to all firms surveyed in a partic-
ular year. Because the data come from a stratified survey, we weight the observations
according to the strata in the survey, specifically employment in three categories (under
20, 20-99, and 100+) and country.27 Further, we cluster the standard errors by country.
The firm level controls come from the same firm-level surveys. As noted above, we
take the log of continuous control variables (i.e. firms’ productivity level, the number of
full-time employees and age) before including them in regression/matching work. The
other firm characteristics such as ownership, quality certificates and importing status
are binary dummy variables. The choice of this set of control variables is based on their
common use in the literature (e.g. Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018), Davies and Jeppesen
27See http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/methodology for discussion on the survey stratification.
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(2015), McCann (2013), Nesterenko (2003), and Pavnic (2002)) where those studies were
in turn motivated by the heterogeneous firms theory popularized by Melitz (2003) and
Ottaviano and Melitz (2008). Overall, the literature suggests that the firms engage in
export/import activities more if they are found to be more productive, bigger in size,
older, and have a certificate or license. As differences were found in these between
SEZ and non-SEZ firms (Table 4) it is therefore important to control for them in our
regression.
To this baseline specification, we introduce additional controls intended to proxy for
the differential impact of export costs, taxes, NTBs, regulation and institutional quality
attributes across SEZ and non-SEZ firms, where for country measure Yj we estimate:
EXPi = β0 + β1SEZi + α1SEZi ∗Yj + β2Xi + θj + θs + θt + εi. (2)
The standard presumption is that SEZs promote exporting as firms located in SEZs
face lower tariffs (or none in imported intermediates), lower non-tariff barriers to ex-
porting, less intrusive regulations, and/or pay lower taxes. Therefore we include these
in our expanded regression.28 Thus, these are the variables we turn to to examine the
conditionality of SEZ effects. To our best knowledge, there is no study which looks
specifically at trade costs/barrier variables and interacts them with SEZ variable.29 Note
that with the inclusion of the additional variables, the marginal effect of being in an SEZ
is a function of β1 + α1 ∗Yj. As our country controls are negative at the mean in the data
with a maximum value of zero (with the exception of export costs which are mean zero
by construction), if α1 is estimated to be negative, this means that α1 ∗ Yj is positive, i.e.
being in an SEZ increases exporting with an impact that approaches zero as the barrier
rises.
3.2 Propensity Score Matching
As an alternative estimation strategy, we employ propensity score matching approach.
The general idea behind this approach is to find a match for SEZ firms (treatment group)
from non-SEZ firms (control group) based on similarities in characteristics (productivity,
employment size, age, ownership etc.). This ensures that the firms in our compared
groups are alike and by that it reduces any selection bias which may be effecting the
results from regression. With this matching approach, the goal is to estimate the follow-
ing:
τATT = ESEZ=1,p(X)(E(EXP(1)|SEZ=1,p(X))− E(EXP(0)|SEZ=1,p(X))) (3)
which is the difference in the exporting variable E (here, the exporter dummy, export
intensity, or export value) when the firm is in an SEZ (i.e. is treated) versus when it
is not, holding the probability of the firm being in the SEZ constant (see Caliendo and
Kopeinig, 2008).30 As any remaining differences in the productivities of the matched
28Summary statistics for these are in Table 3.
29Yang, et al. (2011) include controls such as financial services, tax incentives, and land price variables
in their export performance analysis, but do not condition the SEZ effect on them.
30Note that we continue to control for country, sector, and year dummies in this.
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sample of SEZ and non-SEZ firms is attributed to the treatment, it is paramount to en-
sure that all observable factors influencing the firm’s selection into a given treatment
as well as the firm’s exporting behaviour, are controlled for. Although several match-
ing approaches are available, using a caliper of .0001 worked best with respect to the
tests of appropriateness (see Panel B of Table 6, discussed momentarily). This, however,
comes at the cost of the number of firms for which a match could be found, resulting
in only 4250 non-SEZ firms and 2645 SEZ firms for which there was common support
(i.e. slightly over half the sample). Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018) also use the same
matching approach like ours as a robustness check.31
4 The Results
4.1 Regression Analyses: The Extensive Margin of Trade
In Table 5 we present our estimates for the probability of exporting, i.e. on the exten-
sive margin. Here, we use a logit estimator due to the binary nature of the dependent
variable.32 Column 1 presents the results using only the standard set of controls, all of
which are positive and significant as expected with the exceptions of the multi-product
and license dummies which are insignificant.33 Note that we are not claiming causa-
tion, but merely correlation due to the lack of time series data needed for improved
identification. In column 2, we introduce the SEZ dummy variable. As can be seen,
after controlling for the other differences across firms, we find no significant impact of
the SEZ variable. This is comparable to results Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018) obtain
from Polish data and Steenbergen and Javorcik’s (2017) estimates from Rwanda data.
Note that these two papers are also able to use time-series information, and therefore
have more robust identification. Thus, the finding in Table 4 indicating a difference in
the probability of exporting seems to be the result of other differences across firms, not
whether or not they are in an SEZ.
31 In addition, they also employ the propensity score matching using a difference in difference method
which compares changes over time after a firm becomes located in an SEZ (see Guo and Fraser (2014),
Heckman, et al. (1997)). This was also done by Steenbergen and Javorcik (2017). This is not possible in
our case due to our reliance on cross-sectional data.
32Note that as a firm either exports or does not, we do not suffer from violations of the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives assumption. Further, as we need to control for country, sector, and year dummies,
we cannot use a probit estimator.
33Elliott and Virakul (2010) find a similar result for multi-product firms when using developing coun-
tries.
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Table 5: Probability of Exporting
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Productivity 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.188*** 0.184*** 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.187*** 0.191***
(0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0228)
Employment 0.601*** 0.601*** 0.604*** 0.601*** 0.601*** 0.601*** 0.602*** 0.603***
(0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0251) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0251)
Age 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.196*** 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.190*** 0.194*** 0.194***
(0.0396) (0.0399) (0.0401) (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0400) (0.0402)
Foreign Owned 0.467*** 0.466*** 0.480*** 0.460*** 0.470*** 0.455*** 0.484*** 0.450***
(0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.137)
Quality Cert. 0.752*** 0.751*** 0.744*** 0.752*** 0.750*** 0.752*** 0.750*** 0.748***
(0.0690) (0.0694) (0.0695) (0.0695) (0.0694) (0.0694) (0.0696) (0.0695)
Multi-product 0.0392 0.0397 0.0454 0.0394 0.0397 0.0389 0.0410 0.0461
(0.0649) (0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0651)
License 0.0262 0.0254 0.0147 0.0265 0.0245 0.0271 0.0187 0.0125
(0.0809) (0.0812) (0.0814) (0.0812) (0.0812) (0.0813) (0.0813) (0.0817)
Import 1.139*** 1.139*** 1.150*** 1.137*** 1.140*** 1.134*** 1.148*** 1.144***
(0.0781) (0.0781) (0.0781) (0.0781) (0.0781) (0.0781) (0.0782) (0.0785)
SEZ 0.0115 -0.0155 0.516 -0.280 0.639 -1.979** 2.058
(0.0757) (0.0778) (0.621) (0.783) (0.538) (0.964) (1.575)
Export costs*SEZ -0.317*** -0.543***
(0.108) (0.160)
Taxes*SEZ 0.124 0.212
(0.151) (0.379)
Regulation*SEZ -0.0517 -0.102
(0.138) (0.384)
Institutions*SEZ 0.113 0.470**
(0.0958) (0.187)
NTBs*SEZ -0.326** -0.130
(0.156) (0.377)
Constant -8.320*** -8.321*** -8.223*** -8.460*** -8.298*** -8.493*** -8.404*** -9.196***
(0.509) (0.509) (0.524) (0.548) (0.513) (0.542) (0.507) (0.796)
Net SEZ effect=0 0.84 0.72 0.89 0.64 0.72 0.43
Observations 11,161 11,161 11,161 11,161 11,161 11,161 11,161 11,161
Notes: ***, **, and * on difference denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include country,
sector, and year dummies. Net SEZ Effect = 0 reports the p value at the sample mean.
One feature of this result, however, is that it assumes that the impact of SEZs is
the same everywhere. As discussed in the introduction, SEZs are often intended to
aid firms in overcoming trade barriers. Thus, it may be that the positive effect of an
SEZ is found in a country where exporting is expensive. With this in mind, column 3
introduces an interaction between the SEZ dummy and the export cost variable (recall
that since the export cost is a country-level variable and each country is surveyed in a
single year, the country dummy absorbs the non-interacted export cost variable).34 If
SEZs aid in overcoming export costs and therefore play a role mostly in high export
cost countries, we expect this coefficient to be positive. In contrast, we find that it is
significantly negative, i.e. in a high export cost country an SEZ firm is less likely to
34Although the surveys contain some firm-level information on exporting, as this is available reported
only by exporters, we cannot make use of these data as they are missing for non-exporting firms.
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export. This may reflect the findings of Johansson and Nilsson (1997), where they argue
that SEZs encourage exports in primarily export-oriented (i.e. low export cost) countries.
As reported at the bottom of the table, at the sample mean for export costs, the estimated
marginal effect is insignificant.
This should not, however, be interpreted as no significant effect since at the sample
mean export costs are zero (by construction). Instead, this should be interpreted as
in Figure 1 which plots the difference in the estimated probability of exporting for an
SEZ firm relative to a non-SEZ firm (vertical axis), all else equal, across the spectrum
of export cost values (horizontal axis). The figure indicates that if in a country export
costs are low (i.e. the left upper corner) SEZ firms are more likely to export with the
reverse found when exporting is expensive (i.e. right bottom corner). At the minimum of
the export cost measure, the estimated marginal effect is positive and highly significant
(with a probability value of 0.004). Likewise, for the maximum export costs, the impact
is significantly negative (with a probability value of 0.004). This seemingly paradoxical
result may be driven by the constrained optimization of trade authorities. When an
economy is closed, relatively little funding may be available to the officials regulating
exports. Therefore they would have an incentive to focus their efforts in locations where
the values of production, productivity and exports are particularly high, i.e. SEZs.35
This greater scrutiny within an SEZ may then increase the probability of inspection,
increasing the expected need for the appropriate export permits which, particularly in
these countries, are costly. As such, while some aspects of exporting may be reduced by
the SEZ, the fixed cost of doing so may rise. In more open and better funded countries,
however, this effect would be smaller as the trade authority casts a wider inspection
net, allowing the export promoting aspects of SEZs to dominate. Furthermore, these
effects are economically large. Approximately 40% of firms in low export cost countries
export. As such, the nearly 0.1 increase for low export cost countries in Figure 1 is a 25%
increase in the probability of exporting. At the other end, in high export cost countries,
only about 20% of firms export. Therefore the roughly 0.2 reduction would reduce the
probability of exporting by nearly 100%.
In columns (4), (5), and (6), we repeat this exercise, replacing the export cost in-
teraction with an interaction using the tax, regulation, and institution indices. In each
case, neither the SEZ variable nor its interaction is significant. In column (7), we utilize
the NTB interaction and find a negative coefficient on this interaction. At the sample
mean (where the NTB value is -5.991), the net effect of an SEZ is −1.979 + (−0.326) ∗
(−5.991) = −0.026, which as indicated at the bottom of the table we cannot reject as dif-
ferent from zero. However, as with the export cost, this masks variation across countries
that is revealed when plotting the difference in export probabilities across the different
NTB levels in Figure 2. The figure shows that whenever NTB level is low (i.e. upper left
corner) the higher the probability that firms in SEZs would export as oppose to firms in
non-SEZ areas. For countries with minimal NTBs, as with the export cost measure, the
net effect is positive and significant. For high NTB countries, the impact is negative and
significant with the effect in very high NTB countries estimated to equate to roughly a
35A comparable effect is found by Go´mez-Guillamo´n and Sanchez-Val (2012) who find that tax auditing
is more effective in more dense areas.
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Figure 1: Change in the Probability of Exporting - Export Costs
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50% reduction in the probability of exporting. Thus, again we see that closed economies
are those where NTBs seem to lower the probability of exporting. Finally, column (8)
includes all five interactions where only the export cost and institution coefficients are
significant. Here, we find that SEZs increase the export probability in countries with
weak institutions. In addition, we again find that they reduce the export probability
in countries with high export costs. Finally, as in column (3), we find a significantly
positive net effect for low export cost countries (with a probability value of 0.001) and
a significantly negative effect for high export cost nations (with a probability value of
0.0007).
4.2 Propensity Score Matching: Probability of Exporting
Table 6 displays the results of propensity score matching. In Panel A of the table results
with the unmatched sample indicates that SEZ firms are significantly more likely to ex-
port (as in Table 4). However, after matching, i.e. ensuring that probability of treatment
is controlled for, the difference between SEZ and non-SEZ firms is insignificantly nega-
tive with a value of τATT = −0.0159. This is in line with the results of Steenbergen and
Javorcik (2017) but in contradiction to the matching results from Nazarczuk and Umin-
ski (2018) who report τATT = 0.184 which is statistically significant at 1% level. Beyond
the obvious differences in data sets, it should be noted that export barriers in Rwanda
are likely large in comparison to the countries in our sample whereas Polish barriers are
likely relatively low. Coming back to our result, the negative differences in the proba-
bility of exporting are driven not by a firm being in an SEZ, but by the characteristics
of firms in SEZs. In order to support the validity of this test, Panel B presents three
post-estimation checks, discussed in Caliendo and Koeinig (2008). The first of these is a
two-sample t-test, which works by comparing the means of the covariates between the
SEZ and non-SEZ firms, before and after matching. If the matching is of a high qual-
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Figure 2: Change in the Probability of Exporting - NTBs
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ity (i.e. the distribution of treated and control groups are quite similar), no significant
differences should be found after matching. As the table indicates, it is indeed the case.
The second test involves re-estimating the propensity score using the matched sample
and comparing the Pseudo R-squared obtained from the probit estimation before and
after matching. Again, if the matching is of a high quality, the distribution of the co-
variates should be similar across treated and untreated firms, resulting in a relatively
low pseudo-R2 after matching has taken place. Again, this holds. Finally, we perform a
likelihood test on the joint significance of all the variables included in the probit model
before and after matching. Following the same logic, we should expect to reject this
test on the matched sample only (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) which is again the case.
Thus, these tests support the validity of the matching.
Combining these results, we see that the impact of SEZs on the probability of export-
ing is a nuanced one. In open economies, particularly those generally open to exports,
SEZs seem to increase exporting at the extensive margin. For those that are closed to
exports and/or imports, however, the opposite effect is found. This is consistent with
Johansson and Nilsson (1997) and may be reflective of differences between open and
closed economies with respect to the effectiveness of trade authorities.
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Table 6: Propensity Score Matching: Probability of Exporting
Panel A: Selection
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
Unmatched 0.207978311 0.193411765 0.014566 0.00830 1.75
ATT 0.2 0.215879017 -0.015879 0.01457 -1.09
Panel B: Sensitivity Test
Variable Matched Treated Control T stat Prob. Val.
Productivity Unmatched 10.151 9.5113 22.3 0.000
Matched 10.058 10.063 -0.15 0.884
Employment Unmatched 3.9051 3.6355 9.92 0.000
Matched 3.7916 3.8166 -0.7 0.483
Age Unmatched 2.7018 2.7577 -3.47 0.001
Matched 2.7471 2.7555 -0.4 0.691
Foreign Owned Unmatched 0.03428 0.03576 -0.39 0.695
Matched 0.02987 0.02949 0.08 0.935
Quality Cert. Unmatched 0.52401 0.25765 27.22 0.000
Matched 0.46578 0.46994 -0.3 0.762
Multi-product Unmatched 0.26569 0.39294 -13.26 0.000
Matched 0.27713 0.29452 -1.4 0.162
License Unmatched 0.13865 0.09106 7.16 0.000
Matched 0.10851 0.09981 1.04 0.301
Import Unmatched 0.12393 0.14024 -2.33 0.020
Matched 0.11682 0.1293 -1.38 0.167
Sample Pseudo R2 LR χ2 p > χ2
Raw 0.229 2966.48 0
Matched 0.005 34.08 0.833
4.3 Regression Estimates: The Intensive Margin of Trade
The above results indicate that SEZs have an impact on the extensive margin of trade;
however in closed economies, this effect is negative suggesting that SEZs there may in-
crease inspections and the fixed cost of exporting. This does not, however, mean that
they must also reduce trade for firms that choose to export since they may simultane-
ously work to lower the marginal cost of exporting. In this section, we use two measures
of the intensive margin, the logged share of sales generated via exports (export inten-
sity) and the logged value of exports (export value). Note that in this analysis, we restrict
ourselves to the set of exporting firms and thus face no problems with zero exports.
4.3.1 Regression Estimates and Matching: Export Intensity
Table 7 begins by estimating the effect of SEZs and the other controls on the export
intensity using the same approach as in Table 5. Because the export intensity cannot
exceed zero (the log of 1), we use a Tobit estimator. As can be seen, SEZs have limited
effects. In column (7), we find a marginally significant coefficient both for the SEZ vari-
able and the interaction. Figure 3 plots the estimated difference between an SEZ firm’s
export intensity a comparable non-SEZ firm across the different NTB levels. The figure
indicates that when the NTB level is high in a country (upper right corner) the higher
17
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the relative export intensity of an SEZ firm (note that in this and subsequent figures,
confidence intervals are included but that they are difficult to see due to the preciseness
of the estimates). For open economies (left-hand side of the graph), the point estimate of
this difference is negative but economically small. For high NTB countries, however, the
effect is significantly positive (with a probability value of 0.049 at the maximum NTB).
However, when we also control for export costs in column (8), this effect disappears to
be replaced by a marginally negative coefficient on the interaction between SEZ status
and trade costs. This results in a pattern similar to Figure 1; however it is only for high
export cost countries that we find a significant net effect. That said, as the significance
of the coefficients is not particularly strong, we do not wish to make too much of these
results, preferring to instead say that the evidence of an SEZ effect on export intensity is
at best limited. Other controls do, however, have a strong impact on the export intensity.
In particular, younger, single-product, non-importers earn a greater share of sales from
exporting.
Table 7: Export Intensity
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Productivity -0.0349 -0.0368 -0.0364 -0.0369 -0.0377* -0.0369 -0.0392* -0.0396*
(0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0227)
Employment 0.0311 0.0314 0.0314 0.0314 0.0322 0.0312 0.0322 0.0342
(0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0249)
Age -0.166*** -0.161*** -0.160*** -0.161*** -0.163*** -0.162*** -0.163*** -0.161***
(0.0383) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0383) (0.0382)
Foreign Owned 0.0858 0.0819 0.0811 0.0836 0.0659 0.0795 0.0748 0.0622
(0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.116) (0.117) (0.116) (0.118)
Quality Cert. -0.0883 -0.0943 -0.0947 -0.0944 -0.0961 -0.0946 -0.0959 -0.102
(0.0674) (0.0675) (0.0675) (0.0675) (0.0673) (0.0674) (0.0673) (0.0674)
Multi-product -0.216*** -0.212*** -0.212*** -0.213*** -0.211*** -0.212*** -0.213*** -0.209***
(0.0639) (0.0637) (0.0638) (0.0637) (0.0637) (0.0637) (0.0637) (0.0641)
License 0.0769 0.0736 0.0728 0.0733 0.0772 0.0737 0.0768 0.0760
(0.0780) (0.0779) (0.0779) (0.0780) (0.0781) (0.0779) (0.0780) (0.0779)
Import -0.121* -0.123* -0.122* -0.122* -0.127* -0.124* -0.128* -0.124*
(0.0669) (0.0667) (0.0668) (0.0668) (0.0666) (0.0667) (0.0666) (0.0664)
SEZ 0.0940 0.0904 0.00687 1.026 0.226 1.454* 2.895*
(0.0730) (0.0728) (0.477) (0.652) (0.497) (0.782) (1.515)
Export costs*SEZ -0.0339 -0.224*
(0.0691) (0.131)
Taxes*SEZ -0.0214 -0.0765
(0.117) (0.373)
Regulation*SEZ 0.165 0.134
(0.114) (0.360)
Institutions*SEZ 0.0240 -0.0615
(0.0884) (0.155)
NTBs*SEZ 0.222* 0.445
(0.126) (0.317)
Constant -0.822** -0.852** -0.821** -0.811** -1.006** -0.911** -0.764** -0.295
(0.363) (0.367) (0.365) (0.390) (0.391) (0.413) (0.365) (0.420)
Net SEZ effect=0 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.11 0.23
Observations 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291
Notes: ***, **, and * on difference denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include country,
sector and year dummies. Net SEZ Effect = 0 reports the p value at the sample mean.
As with the extensive margin, one might worry about the endogeneity of the SEZ
variable, thus in Table 8 we employ the same matching technique described above (but
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Figure 3: Change in Intensity of Exporting - NTBs
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Note: 95% Confidence Intervals are extremely narrow and
hence indistringuishable from the line.
replacing the exporter dummy with the export intensity variable). Here, as we have
fewer exporting firms we are forced to rely on a set of 821 non-SEZ firms and 158
SEZ firms for which we had common support. As in the extensive margin results,
after matching we estimate an insignificant τATT = 0.1433 with the post-estimation tests
supporting the quality of the matches. That is in line with Nazarczuk and Uminski
(2018). Thus, after other important firm characteristics are matched, the export intensity
of SEZ and non-SEZ firms are statistically the same.
4.3.2 Regression Estimates and Matching: Export Value
Table 9 turns to the Export Value (again for the set of exporting firms). As with the
export intensity results, we find limited impact of SEZs. That said, we do find a rela-
tively robust impact from the NTB interaction which is significantly positive, both on
its own in column (7) and when used alongside the other interactions in column (8).
Figure 4 illustrates the estimated impact. The figure indicates that whenever NTB level
is high (i.e. closed economies) the higher the difference in export sales level between
firms in SEZs,and those in non-SEZ parts (upper right corner). Comparable to Figure
3, we find no economically significant effect for low NTB countries but an economically
and statistically significant positive effect in high NTB countries. At that end of the NTB
distribution, the expected difference in exports is 0.5 which, relative to the mean export
value of 13.7 in high NTB countries, is a 3.6% increase. This may be evidence of the fact
that it is possible for SEZ firms to import intermediates under reduced duties, increas-
ing production and therefore exports. In addition, column (5) provides some marginal
evidence that SEZ increase export volumes in strong regulation countries, with the ef-
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fect illustrated in Figure 5. The figure suggests that at highly regulated economies the
difference in export volumes become more apparent between firms in SEZs and those
in non-SEZ parts where SEZ firms making more export sales. Again, it is only for the
heavily regulated countries where we estimate an economically significant net effect, one
which indicates that SEZ firms in these nations export a greater value. Beyond the SEZ
variable, unsurprisingly, more productive, larger, and foreign firms export higher values.
Younger, single-product, and non-importing firms also export greater values.
Finally, Table 10 again explores the possibility that our results are driven by endo-
geneity of the SEZ variable. Nevertheless, we again find an insignificant effect after
matching, with τATT = 0.0212. As with the extensive margin, this is consistent with
export value results of Steenbergen and Javorcik (2017) but differs from those Nazarczuk
and Uminski (2018). Note that, as this is the same set of firms as in Table 8 with a dif-
ferent export outcome variable, the post-estimation tests from matching are the same as
reported there.
Table 8: Propensity Score Matching: Export Intensity
Panel A: Selection
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
Unmatched -1.17866516 -0.823489372 -0.355175786 0.052534604 -6.76
ATT -1.14432697 -1.28757787 0.143250898 0.141142051 1.01
Panel B: Sensitivity Test
Variable Treated Control T stat Prob. Val.
Productivity Unmatched 10.46 9.7555 10.68 0.000
Matched 10.357 10.496 -0.89 0.375
Employment Unmatched 4.7738 4.9919 -3.41 0.001
Matched 4.884 4.6757 1.40 0.164
Age Unmatched 2.8231 2.9316 -3.04 0.002
Matched 2.8858 2.9854 -1.20 0.232
Foreign Owned Unmatched .10056 .07186 2.19 0.029
Matched .10759 .06329 1.41 0.160
Quality Cert. Unmatched .69646 .4933 9.17 0.000
Matched .72152 .64557 1.45 0.148
Multi-product Unmatched .26536 .42144 -7.24 0.000
Matched .25949 .24684 0.26 0.797
License Unmatched .19646 .19732 -0.05 0.963
Matched .23418 .20886 0.54 0.589
Import Unmatched .3473 .36784 -0.93 0.355
Matched .3481 .33544 0.24 0.813
Sample Pseudo R2 LR χ2 p > χ2
Raw 0.232 601.61 0
Matched 0.092 39.18 0.179
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Table 9: Value of Exports
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Productivity 0.967*** 0.966*** 0.966*** 0.966*** 0.966*** 0.966*** 0.964*** 0.964***
(0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0169)
Employment 1.011*** 1.011*** 1.011*** 1.011*** 1.011*** 1.011*** 1.011*** 1.013***
(0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184)
Age -0.0852*** -0.0808*** -0.0808*** -0.0807*** -0.0820*** -0.0811*** -0.0825*** -0.0806***
(0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0284) (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0283)
Foreign Owned 0.0716 0.0668 0.0667 0.0676 0.0530 0.0649 0.0581 0.0543
(0.0873) (0.0874) (0.0874) (0.0881) (0.0877) (0.0880) (0.0875) (0.0885)
Quality Cert. -0.0304 -0.0351 -0.0351 -0.0351 -0.0368 -0.0352 -0.0368 -0.0391
(0.0482) (0.0482) (0.0482) (0.0482) (0.0481) (0.0482) (0.0481) (0.0481)
Multi-product -0.134*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.129*** -0.131*** -0.130*** -0.128***
(0.0465) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0466)
License 0.0493 0.0464 0.0463 0.0462 0.0478 0.0463 0.0476 0.0466
(0.0549) (0.0549) (0.0549) (0.0549) (0.0549) (0.0549) (0.0548) (0.0547)
Import -0.110** -0.112** -0.112** -0.112** -0.115** -0.113** -0.116** -0.112**
(0.0496) (0.0496) (0.0496) (0.0496) (0.0496) (0.0495) (0.0495) (0.0495)
SEZ 0.0765 0.0760 0.0364 0.790* 0.167 1.189** 1.898**
(0.0545) (0.0543) (0.381) (0.409) (0.349) (0.506) (0.963)
Export costs*SEZ -0.00411 -0.130
(0.0550) (0.0887)
Taxes*SEZ -0.00989 -0.0236
(0.0948) (0.239)
Regulation*SEZ 0.128* 0.0412
(0.0744) (0.222)
Institutions*SEZ 0.0167 -0.0962
(0.0643) (0.117)
NTBs*SEZ 0.183** 0.367*
(0.0842) (0.217)
Constant -0.642** -0.705** -1.137*** -0.695** -0.773*** -0.734** -0.938*** -0.362
(0.276) (0.276) (0.382) (0.290) (0.278) (0.298) (0.295) (0.573)
Net SEZ effect=0 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.9 0.26
Observations 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291
R-squared 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.839
Notes: ***, **, and * on difference denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include country, sector
and year dummies. Net SEZ Effect = 0 reports the p value at the sample mean.
Table 10: Propensity Score Matching: Export Value
Selection
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
Unmatched 14.0554632 13.9238786 0.131584618 0.099936301 1.32
ATT 14.0969394 13.884578 0.212361387 0.260619058 0.81
4.4 Comparing SEZ Impact Estimates with Other Studies
Combining these results, we find that, while there is limited evidence of SEZs affecting
the export share or the number of exporters, however, they do seem to encourage greater
value of exports in countries with high NTBs/export costs, potentially due to reduced
duties on imported intermediates. As we find no robust effect on the export intensity,
this would suggest that cheaper imports increase both exports and domestic sales pro-
portionally. Further, this is an economically sizable effect. In the high NTB countries, the
mean (log) value of sales is 11.8. Pulling the estimated increase of 0.35 from 4 for these
countries, this means an increase in (non-logged) sales of 41.9%.
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Figure 4: Change in Value of Exports - NTBs
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Because the interaction with these trade barrier measures is our innovation, there are
no comparable results in the literature for us to compare ourselves to. Nevertheless, it is
instructive to compare what is comparable (the non-interacted SEZ dummy in column
2 of Tables 5 (probability of exporting) and 9 (export value)). In Table 11, we compare
our estimates with those in Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018), Steenbergen and Javorcik
(2017), and Nesterenko (2003). While there are differences across the studies, all, use
firm-level data, employ and exporter dummy (using a Logit estimator) or logged ex-
port values (with OLS), and include an SEZ dummy as the variable of interest. However,
there are differences in terms of time, country coverage and the size of samples as shown
in the table. Despite these difference, as reported, the various studies all find positive
coefficents for the SEZ dummy at both level extensive and intensive margins. Overall,
the magnitude of our estimates fall somewhere in the middle with those reported by
Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018) notably higher which might be due to the overall open-
ness of Poland compared to the countries in the other three studies. In general, we find
that our estimates are generally in line with those found elsewhere which suggests that,
across the literature while SEZs do not negatively impact firms’ exporting behavior, their
value as an export-promoting policy tool can be questioned.
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Figure 5: Change in Value of Exports - Regulation
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Table 11: Extensive and Intensive Margin Estimates Compared
Nazarczuk Steenbergena Nesterenkob (2003) Ourc
& Uminski (2018) & Javorcik (2017) Results
Dep. Var. — Exporter (dummy) Exporter (dummy) Exporter (dummy) Exporter (dummy)
SEZ — 1.124 0.0079 0.48311*** 0.0115
Dep. Var. — Export Value (log) Export Value (log) Export Value (log) Export Value (log)
SEZ — 1.740*** 0.159 0.067*** 0.0765
Data — Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level
Obs. — 518 179,149 23,649 11,161/ 2,291
Period(s) — 2004-2014 2008-2016 1996-1999 2007-2014
Sector(s) — Mnfc. Mnfc & Srvs Mnfc. 22 Mnfc.
Country(ies) — Poland Rwanda Ukraine 21 African/Asian
Est. method — Logit/OLS-FE Logit/OLS-FE-DiD Logit/OLS-FE Logit/OLS-FE
Notes: ***, **, and * on difference denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
a They use quarterly firm reports in and outside of SEZs in Kigali, Rwanda.
b Dataset covers 24 counties in Ukraine.
c Our dataset is a cross-sectional one consolidating surveys conducted at some point in 2007-14 period
4.5 Additional Regressions
To explore the data further, we examined several alternative samples. First, rather than
manufacturing, we considered agricultural products. There, as in manufacturing, we
23
Review of Economic Analysis, forthcoming, 11 (2019)
found only occasionally significant impacts of SEZs and when this was the case, they
were typically negative and then for the extensive margin. Second, we considered differ-
ent subsamples of manufacturing, specifically food, transport equipment, and textiles.
Although the significance of the coefficients was markedly weaker, potentially due to
the smaller sample sizes, when the SEZ variables were significant, they were compara-
ble to those found here. As a further test of the endogeneity of the SEZ variable, fol-
lowing the results of Ebenstein (2012), we split the sample between foreign-owned and
domestically-owned firms since he found that the first group was more likely to locate in
an SEZ than elsewhere. Nevertheless, we found the same results in these subsamples as
in the combined sample, again suggesting that endogeneity is not driving the result. We
estimated the effect of SEZs separately for Asian and African countries (the two groups
in our data) and excluding India (which represents a large share of the sample). In both
cases, neither the SEZ variable itself nor its interactions were significant. We also tried to
interact importer dummy with the NTB and export cost variables.36 When doing so, we
find that importers in SEZs have a smaller impact from NTBs on their exporting behavior
at both margins, suggestive that SEZs might help to mitigate some of the trade barriers
felt by importers who also wish to export. Finally, in our intensive margin regressions,
we explored the potential role of the WTO’s Export Share Requirement (ERS) policy.37.
This policy demands that, to be consistent with WTO rules, firms in SEZs should be
required to achieve a minimum export intensity (Defever and Riano, 2017). In Table 4,
we show that the export share of SEZ firms is instead smaller than for non-SEZ ones,
suggesting a contradiction of the ERS policy. Delving deeper, this difference is driven by
two countries, Zimbabwe and South Africa.38 That said, after dropping these two coun-
tries, our results do not change significantly. All of these additional results are available
on request.
5 Conclusion
Special economic zones have long been touted as a method of increasing exports and,
as a result, improving the level of development in a region. While there are numer-
ous case studies on the issue, there is scant econometric evidence testing the notion.
We contribute to the debate by providing the first firm-level, cross-country econometric
study testing whether SEZs do in fact increase exports at either the extensive or inten-
sive margins. The resulting pattern is a nuanced one. At the extensive margin, SEZs
increase the likelihood of exporting by as much as 25%, but only for firms in relatively
open economies. In closed economies, we find the opposite effect, something that might
be consistent with differing patterns of enforcement across countries. At the intensive
margin, we find little evidence suggesting that SEZs affect the share of sales earned
36This was motivated in part by Yang, et al. (2011) who find that firms choose to move to SEZs in
China because they import raw materials and intermediates. Thus, the import duty reductions in the SEZ
significantly lower importers’ production costs.
37We thank one of our reviewers for suggesting this.
38Those countries might have removed the ERS policy to attract more FDI to their SEZs as done by the
Dominican Republic (Defever, et al. 2017).
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from exporting. They do, however, seem to markedly increase the value of exports in
countries with import barriers, something that suggests that SEZs may reduce the cost
of intermediate inputs, encouraging both domestic and foreign sales. Combining these
effects, if the goal is to increase exporting, it is likely that policy makers will need to
consider SEZs in light of the local economic environment before choosing to use them.
This is consistent with the other single-country studies on SEZs and, as indicated in
Yang, et al. (2011), it may suggest that the additional costs of being in an SEZ (e.g.
higher fixed setup costs) can outweigh their benefits. That said, our results do indicate a
conditional effectiveness of SEZs and future research with access to panel data can help
to fill out the policy environment for which they do (or do not) promote exporting. In
particular, our estimates suggest that in open economies, SEZs affect the extensive mar-
gin positively with little effect on the intensive margin whereas for closed economies,
introducing SEZs may mean greater exports spread across fewer firms. As these have
distributional consequences across firms and regions, such factors should be considered
when creating SEZs. As such, we hope that our results provide a stepping stone to the
development of a framework under which SEZs play a useful role in a general overhaul
of a country’s policies.
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